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Executive Summary
Over the last decade, managed-care companies have been consolidating on
both a regional and national scale. More recently, nonprofit health pians have
been converting to for-profit status, and this conversion has frequently
occurred as a step to facilitate merger or acquisition with a for-profit company.
Some industry observers attribute these managed-care marketplace trends to
an industry shakeout resulting from increased competitionin the sector. At
the same time, these perceived competitive pressures have led to questions
about the long-run viability of nonprofit health plans. Furthermore, some
industry and government leaders believe that some nonprofits are abeady
conducting themselves like for-profit health plans and question the state pre-
mium tax exemption ordinarily accorded to such plans. This paper examines
related health policy issues through the lens of a case study of the proposed
conversion of the CareFirst Blue Cross Blue Shield company to a for-profit
public-stock company and its merger with the Welipoint Corporation.
Company executives and board members argued that CareFirst lacked access
to sufficient capital and faced serious threats to its viability as afinancially
healthy nonprofit health care company. They also argued that CareFirst and its
beneficiaries would benefit from merger through enhanced economies of scale
and product-line extensions. Critics of the proposed conversion and merger
raised concerns about the adverse impacts on access to care, coverage avail-
ability, quality of care, safety-net providers, and the cost of health insurance.
Analyses demonstrate that CareFirst wields substantial market power in its
local market, that it is unlikely to realize cost savings through expanded
economies of scale, and that access to capital concerns are largely driven by
the perceived need for further expansion through merger and acquisition.
Although it is impossible to predict future changes in quality of care for
CareFirst, analyses suggest that quality appears to be somewhat lower in for-
profit national managed-care companies. Additional research is needed to
assess the viability of true nonprofits, the potentialeffects of nonprofits and
for-profit national managed-care plans on the evolution of local insurance
and provider markets, and methods for effective oversight of nonprofit
health plans.130 Beaulieu
I.Introduction
In 1994, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) Association changed its
bylaws to allow members to convert to public-stock companies. This
touched off a streak of conversions and health plan combinations. To
date, fourteen BCBS plans have converted to for-profit plans anda few
more have conversions pending. Consolidation has also occurred
among BCBS plans; in 1996, there were sixty-three BCBS plans in oper-
ation; in 2003, there were forty-one. In many instances, BCBS plans
have converted with the explicit intention of being acquiredor of merg-
ing with another firm; hence conversions and consolidationare inter-
twined. This situation has certainly been the case for two BCBS plans
that have led the consolidation trend. Anthem, Inc. isa publicly traded
BCBS plan that was built up through the acquisition of exclusive BCBS
licenses in nine states. WellPoint, Inc. began with the conversion of the
California Blue Cross Association and has grown to the largest BCBS
company, with operations in California, Georgia, and Missouri.1
Regional consolidation has also occurredamong nonprofit BCBS plans
(for example, the Regence Group with operations in Washington,
Oregon, Utah, and Idaho).
These changes among BCBS Association members have occurred
against a backdrop of the growing presence of national managed-care
companies and for-profit health plans in the health maintenanceorgan-
ization (HMO) industry. As shown in figures 5.1 and 5.2, HMO enroll-
ment increased 173 percent from 1987 to 2001. Nearly three-quarters of
the increase is attributable to enrollment growth in for-profit health
plans; 50 percent of the enrollment growth occurred in for-profit
national managed-care plans. Some industry analysts have argued
that the rise of national managed-care companies has precipitated
conversion and consolidation among BCBS plans.
Each of the conversion cases is unique. Local health plan marketsare
unique, and so the health plans that operate in them evolve witha
unique history. Thus, the evaluations of specific conversion petitions
(and possible acquisitions and mergers) must take into account factors
unique to each market. Some policy issues are common to allconver-
sions, however, and in this paper I develop a framework for analyzing
these issues and clarifying the trade-offs faced by policy makers.
Following a general discussion of the policy issues and the develop-
ment of an analytic framework, I present a case study analysis ofa par-
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filed applications to convert to public-stock ownership with insurance
commissioners in the states of Delaware and Maryland, and in the
District of Columbia. CareFirst's conversion application was explicitly
linked to subsequent acquisition by Wellpoint Inc. I present analyses
that were conducted for the public advocacy organization, D.C.
Appleseeds, to support its participation in the formal proceedings in
Washington, D.C. At the end of this paper, I discuss the information
gaps that plague research and policy analysis on this topic, opportuni-
ties for health economists to contribute to policy in this arena, and the
limitations and generalizability of my case study research.
II.Policy Issues in Health Plan Conversions
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans are not the only health plans to con-
vert to public-stock ownership. The BCBS conversion petitions have
sparked the most public debate however, partly because of the special
circumstances in which they were created and because their conversion
typically requires a formal determination by a regulatory official; some
conversions even require legislation. This paper deals specifically with
BCBS conversions; however, several of the health policy issues are ger-
mane to other health plan conversions and more generally to the role
of nonprofit organizations in health care.
Origins of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans
Many of the health policy issues that arise in connection with the con-
version to for-profit status of BCBS plans relate in some way to the
original creation of the Blue Cross companies. As detailed in
Blackstone and Fuhr(1998),most of the Blue Cross plans were initiated
by the hospital industry in the1920sand1930sto provide hospital
insurance at a time when hospitals experienced declining occupancy
rates and escalating operating costs. Typically, these plans were estab-
lished through state legislation as public-benefit organizations, and
they were intended to serve as insurers of last resort. In enacting legis-
lation to establish the Pennsylvania BC plan in1937,Representative
Herbert Cohen remarked:
The Legislature of Pennsylvania in approving this law was attempting to meet
a severe need of providing citizens of Pennsylvania with hospital care at a cost
within their means and also of providing hospitals with a source of financial
support which would place them in a more stable financial position and there-
fore less dependent upon state and local tax funds. The Legislature thereforeAn Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 133
was attempting to fill a gap created by commercial insurance companies'
underwriting policies which left the mass of Pennsylvania citizens unprotected
from hospitalization expenses and hospital bills in many instances unpaid.2
The plans were exempted from state income taxes on premiums and in
return were subject to various regulations and charged with a public
service commitment. Blue Shield plans were created to provide insur-
ance for physician services. The two insurance associations merged
into the BCBS Association in 1982.
Nonprofit BCBS Plans and the Public Interest
Because these plans were chartered as tax-exempt organizations for
public benefit, state insurance commissioners are obligated to assess
whether conversion to a public-stock company is in the public's inter-
est. In addition, in the case in which conversion precedes the sale of a
BCBS plan, the insurance commissioner must ascertain that the public
receives fair value for the plan from the acquirer.4'5 In some instances,
the proceeds of the sale are placed in a foundation; these funds are
often used to meet the original objectives of the BCBS plansto
provide access to health care services for those in need.6
In reaching a judgment on whether conversion advances the public
interest, state insurance commissioners are likely to take into account
the potential effects of conversion on multiple stakeholders. For exam-
ple, the insurance commissioner will want to know how conversion
will affect insurance coverage for vulnerable populations and reim-
bursement to providers. This analysis of the effects of conversion will
require an understanding of how, if at all, the behavior or conduct of the
health plan might change as a result of the conversion and potential
sale or merger. The insurance commissioner may consider at least six
dimensions of health plan conduct. Each is discussed in the following
subsections. Changes in the conduct of the health plan in any of these
areas could influence access to health care, insurance coverage, the
quality of the health care services provided, health status in the
population, the financial health of providers, and the costs of health
insurance to individuals and employers.
Products Offered and Markets Served.Most health plans offer sev-
eral different health insurance products, and some of these products
are tailored for particular subpopulations. Products may differ on
several dimensions: the provider network, reimbursement for care134 Beaulieu
provided by providers not in the network, co-insurance and copay-
ment rates, services covered (i.e., benefit design), and maximum pay-
ments under the policy. In some states, nonprofit health plans are
required to offer plans in which any person may enroll without
regard for the individual's age, employment status, health status, or
any other factor that might otherwise cause the individual to be
denied health insurance. These plans are sometimes referred to as
open enrollment plans. In deciding on the set of health insurance
products to offer, health plans make implicit choices about whether to
serve certain subpopulations. For example, not all health plans
choose to offer a Medicaid or Medicare product; other noteworthy
subpopulations include the small-business segment, the individual
policy segment, and the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program
(FEHBP).
Quality of Care.Health plans can influence the quality of health care
services delivered to enrollees in several ways. Many of these levers
require financial outlays by the health plan for patient and physician
education, information systems, and program design and administra-
tion. For example, health plans may design and implement chronic
disease management programs.
Quality of Service.Health plans have frequent interactions with
enrollees about coverage issues, the status of particular claims, and the
plan's provider network. The maimer in which these inquiries are
resolved may not directly affect quality of care but may indirectly affect
access to care.
Pricing and Underwriting Practices.In some states, health insur-
ance premiums for particular managed-care products are community
rated, which means that the insurance regulator has eliminated the
health plan's pricing decision and requires all plans serving a specific
population to charge the same premium. In other states, premiums
(and benefit design) for some products are subject to review by the
insurance regulator. In yet other states, there is no regulatory over-
sight of health plan pricing policies. Depending on the regulatory
regime of the state in which the health plan is operating, the health
plan may be able to adjust premiums based on the risk factors of the
group (or individual) to be insured. These are the firms' underwriting
policies.An Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 135
Provider Networks and Reimbursement.In most states and for most
products, health plans have a free hand in deciding which providers to
include in their networks and in negotiating the level and the form of
reimbursement for services delivered to enrollees.7 It is frequently
noted anecdotally that some health plans reimburse at levels substan-
tially above or below other health plans in the same market. Health
plans may institute other policies that make it more or less difficult for
the physician to be reimbursed for health care services. For example,
some providers criticize utilization review andprecertification as bur-
densome interventions that increase physicians' costs of delivering
care and decrease patients' access to care.
Public and Community Health Efforts.Most health plans earmark
some resources for outreach efforts intended to improve thehealth of
community members regardless of enrollment in the health plan. These
efforts include measures such as free screening for certain diseases and
public health education.
Necessary Conditions for Changes in Health Plan Conduct
Whether the conversion or conversion/sale of a health plan is likely to
alter the health plan's conduct on any of the above dimensions hinges
on two conditions. First, depending on the regulatory environmentand
the nature of the market in which the health plan operates, the plan
may or may not be able to change its conduct on someof these dimen-
sions. For example, maybe all health plans operating in a particular
state, regardless of their tax status, must reimburse hospitals according
to the same mandated fee schedule. An alternative potential constraint
on health plan conduct may be present in the level ofmarket competi-
tion. Consultants to one health plan applying for conversion have
argued that the market in which the health plan was operating was so
competitive that it effectively limited the prices the health plan could
charge and still attract enrollees.8
The second condition necessary for a conversion or a conversion/
sale to result in a change of conduct is that such change must be
expected to increase the short- or long-term profitability of the health
plan. Conceptually, a converting health plan could increase prof-
itability in three ways. First, it could terminate the practice of cross-
subsidizing premiums on unprofitable insurance products or
subsidizing care delivery by certain providers. Eliminating a subsidy
or cross-subsidy could increase profitsbut only at the expense of one136 Beaulieu
of the stakeholders (i.e., some population of consumers or providers);
thus, this type of change in conduct would amount to a value transfer
from consumers and/or providers to shareholders.
The second mechanism through which a converting health plan may
increase profits is through investment in new products and technolo-
gies. Two examples in this category come to mind. Some market
observers and participants allege that nonprofit health plans have lim-
ited access to capital and therefore may be unable to make theneces-
sary investments that would lead to new products or lower costs.
Nonprofit health plans may also be subject to some organizational iner-
tia and that, while they possess the necessary resources and capabili-
ties, they do not feel compelled to innovate. This organizational inertia
could be attributable to insulation from competitive pressure afforded
by the state tax exemption on premiums. A change in conduct of this
nature could lead to value creation because consumers would benefit
from new products and reduced costs.
The third mechanism through which a converting health planmay
increase profits is through improved efficiency resulting from
erthanced accountability and governance structures. In nonprofit
organizations, the residual claimants to the surplus created by an
organization are unclear. Those who make decisions for the organiza-
tion do not have a clear objective function; consequently it is difficult
to identify suitable performance measures, to structure appropriate
incentives, and to hold decision makers accountable. Reducing ineffi-
ciency through improved accountability and governance structures isa
value-creating activity because it results in services being delivered at
the lowest cost to society overall.
Recall that the insurance commissioner must determine whether a
conversion is likely to advance the public interest. If the expected
changes in health plan behavior do not have the potential to create
additional value and are simply a transfer from consumers and
providers to prospective shareholders, it would seem difficult to argue
that the conversion is in the public interest. On the other hand, if the
expected changes in health plan behavior are likely to result in new
and better products, conversion may indeed advance public welfare. In
all likelthood, a health plan conversion will have the potential for both
value creation and value transfer. In these cases, the insurancecom-
missioner must, in essence, make a judgment that involves trade-offs
among different stakeholders.An Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 137
Other Considerations Beyond Changes in Health Plan Conduct
The simple alternatives of approving or denying the conversion peti-
tion are more complicated than they might seem at first glance. The
consequences of approving the conversion are not simply the antici-
pated costs and benefits of changes in health plan conduct; one must
also consider the opportunities afforded by an endowed foundation
charged with the mission of serving the public interest. The conse-
quences of denying the conversion are not simply the preservation of
the status quo. One must consider the factors that prompted the con-
version petition in the first place and what they signal about the evo-
lution of the local health care market and the viability of the health plan
petitioning to convert.
To assess whether a foundation could more efficiently execute the
public-service mission of a nonprofit health plan, it is instructive first
to evaluate the extent to which the petitioning health plan is currently
executing this mission and to approximate the resources it requires
(both financial and organizational) to do so. Only then can one deter-
mine whether a foundation can accomplish the same task at a lower
cost or implement an expanded mission with the funds available from
the conversion.
Oversight of a nonprofit health plan's execution of its mission is not
typically considered to be in the purview of state insurance regulators
and is largely delegated to board members. Some question surrounds
whether these nonprofit health plans are completely fulfilling their
missions as public-benefit organizations. In written testimony submit-
ted to the Maryland Insurance Administration in March 2002, William
Jews, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the CareFirst Blue Cross Blue
Shield Company explains when and why the Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Maryland (BCBSMD) plan stopped filling the role of insurer of last
resort:
As with other Blues Plans being formed at about the same time, the [Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Maryland plani was conceived with the goal of
providing affordable health care insurance using "community rating"
principles. This worked effectively at a time when few, if any, commercial
carriers were offering health coverage. In the 1960s, commercial insurance
carriers began entering the health insurance market in earnest and
introduced the concept of "experience rating." As commercial carriers
focused on providing coverage at lower premiums to the healthiest
individuals and groups, Blues Plans like BCBSMD continued to extend
coverage to all corners, including high risk through its community rating138 Beaulieu
mechanism. As a result, many Blue Plans became known as "insurers of
last resort" in their service areas.
That role of insurer of last resort changed in the 1960s when the federal
governmentin essenceassumed the mantle of insurer of last resort by
establishing the Medicare and Medicaid programs to guarantee health
covered to the aged and disabled and to provide coverage to the poor. From
that point forward, Blues Plans began to compete with commercial insur-
ance carriers and the long-standing expectation that "Blues" would act as
the insurer of last resort was greatly minimized. In addition, the continued
use by our competitors of experience rating, which gave them an unfair
advantage, forced most Blue Plans to abandon community rating in order to
survive.
Jews contends that the creation of public insurance programs by
the federal government relieved the Blues plans of fulfilling their
role as insurers of last resort. If the public-service mission of BCBS
plans is limited to the narrow interpretation of providing affordable
health insurance using community rating, and if this mission has
been abandoned by BCBS plans seeking to convert, then the insur-
ance commissioner's decision about whether to approve a conver-
sion petition is somewhat simplified. Under the current organization
and governance structure, the nonprofit plan is receiving a tax
exemption while operating in a manner closely resembling that of a
for-profit health plan; the foregone tax receipts and the alternative
uses of the plan's assets are the opportunity costs of disallowing the
conversion and requiring the health plan to continue under the sta-
tus quo.
The insurance commissioner may decide, however, that the public
interest would be better served by going beyond denial of the petition
and instituting reform of the health plan governance structures and
accountability systems to ensure that it pursues its original mission.
Whether or not this approach is the best course of action hinges on two
additional analyses: (1) an assessment of whether the mission will be
executed more efficiently by a suitably reformed nonprofit health plan
or a newly created foundation, and (2) whether either institution is
viable in the long run.
In his statements above, Jews asserts that the BCBSMD plan
was compelled to abandon its original mission so it could survive
competition from commercial insurance carriers. These views are
echoed in a recent account of the conversion of the Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plan of New York.9 James Robinson recounts how stateAn Economic Analysis of Health PlanConversions 139
regulators destroyed the delicate balancing actof cross-subsidization
achieved by Empire BCBS when the regulatorsallowed commercial
insurers to enter the market and attracthealthy low-cost enrollees
with lower premiums. These actionsprecipitated an adverse selection
spiral that left Empire with the sickestenrollees and the highest costs.
In general, the long-term financialviability of an efficient nonprofit is
unknown. Research on the regulatory structuresthat might support a
nonprofit health plan and the social efficiencyof such regimes is also
limited.
The foregoing analysis suggests aframework for guiding research
and decision making on health plan conversions(see figure 5.3). Prior
to evaluating the potential changesin health plan conduct and the
effects of these changes on public welfare, theinsurance commissioner
might first want to consider whether:
The public interest mission of thenonprofit can be achieved more
efficiently through a foundation or a health insuranceplan.
Any organization can faithfully executethis mission and remain
financially viable.
After making these assessments, the insurancecommissioner must
then weigh the costs and benefits to differentconstituencies of likely
changes in health plan conduct.
III.Case Study
In the previous section of this paper,I described, in a generic sense,
some of the health policy issuesthat arise when a nonprofit health
plan petitions a state insurance regulator to convert to apublic-stock
company (potentially tobe acquired by another company). In this
section, I present some case studyresearch conducted when the
CareFirst Blue Cross and Blue ShieldCompany (with licenses in
Delaware, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.)petitioned to convert to
a public-stock company,and to be acquired by Welipoint Health
Networks, Inc. I provide a brief descriptionof the CareFirst organi-
zation and the events leading up to theconversion petition. Then
I summarize the main arguments both forand against the conversion
as they have beenpresented in oral and written testimony, in pub-
licly available reports, and in the public press.Next, I present the




















Decision calculus for conversions
quality of care. Finally, I reporton the outcome of the petition and
the research challenges remaining.
Background on CareFirst
CareFirst, Inc. is a holding company with BCBS licenses forDelaware,
the District of Columbia, and Maryland. Thecompany was formed in
1998 with the merger of BCBS of Maryland andBCBS of the National
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CareFirst is overseen by a central board of directors; WilliamJews is
the CEO of CareFirst and CEO of each of the threesubsidiaries that
make up CareFirst: Group Hospitalization and Medical Services Inc.-
GHMSI (the D.C. Blues), CareFirst of Maryland (the MarylandBlues),
and BCBSD (the Delaware Blues). The CareFirst corporationoffers a
wide variety of insurance products in these three jurisdictions.
In November 2001, CareFirst entered into a merger agreementwith
Weilpoint Health Networks, Inc. of California. To consummatethis
merger agreement, CareFirst needed to convertto a for-profit public-
stock company. The insurance commissioners in all threejurisdictions
in which CareFirst operates needed to approve theconversion petition;
however, Maryland was the first jurisdiction to initiateformal pro-
ceedings to evaluate the merits of conversion. As part of theproceed-
ings in Maryland and in the District of Columbia, publichearings and
discovery were conducted to generate information toinform the pub-
lic-interest determination. Valuation studies of CareFirst werealso
initiated.
Summary of Arguments for and Against Conversion
The CareFirst management team and its consultantsadvanced three
primary reasons in support of the conversion petition. First,they cited
an inability to access sufficientcapital to fund investments that would
enhance efficiency, improve customer service, and facilitatethe devel-
opment of new and better products. In theconsultant's report and in
CareFirst's strategic plan, however, it appeared that theneed for capi-
tal was largely driven by plans for acquiring other healthplans. The
need to achieve economies of scale was cited as the primary reasonfor
this acquisition strategy. Second, without these improvements(and
larger scale), they contended that CareFirst's long-runviability was
uncertain. Approving the conversion would therefore "help to secure
the long-term future of the 'Blue' brand in localmarkets."1° Third,
approving the conversion and merger with Weilpointwould benefit
the public because it would result in additional tax receipts(estimated
to be $20 million annually) and the creationof a foundation with an
endowment of $1.3 billion that would be apportioned tothe three
jurisdictions.
Those opposing the conversion cited various concerns, manyof
which related to the future conduct of a for-profit BCBS plan. Concerns
about access to care stemmed from the expectation thatafter conver-
sion, CareFirst would discontinue offering insuranceproducts that142 Beaulieu
served vulnerable populations and that were relatively unprofitable.
Some people feared that CareFirst would raise premiums, tighten
underwriting practices (abandon guaranteed issue), andnarrow the
coverage of the insurance policies it continued to offer. Another policy
concern related to the potential for skimping on quality. Some
providers were not supportive of the conversion petition because they
feared reductions in payment rates, increased administrative burden,
and a more adversarial relationship. Both providers andconsumers
feared the loss of a local institution led by members of thecommunity
with the long-run interests of the community in mind. Two objections
to the conversion were unrelated to anticipated changes in health plan
conduct. Some people felt that Wellpoint's offer of $1.3 billionto
acquire CareFirst was less than the fair value of CareFirstas an ongo-
ing concern.11 Finally, many consumers were outraged about the
bonuses CareFirst executives were scheduled to receive if the dealwent
through.
Economic Analyses
Market Structure.CareFirst executives and consultants have sug-
gested in their filings that the markets in which the CareFirst plans
operate are so competitive that they constrain their ability to raisepre-
miums or lower quality without losing enrollees to other local health
plans. They imply that CareFirst, if it were allowed toconvert to for-
profit status, would not take such actions (raising premiumsor lower-
ing quality) because the loss of enrollment would decrease profits.
Traditionally, economists have used market-sharesummary measures
as proxies for market competitiveness. The belief is that greater con-
centration of market share among a smaller number of firms is likelyto
result in higher prices.
Computing market shares in practice requires definition of the market
and detailed data for each firm. Market definitionscan have large effects
on both measures of concentration and market shares for individual
firms. In this section, I examine the extent of market concentration in the
District of Columbia (D.C.) using data on I-IlvlO and managed-care enroll-
ment.12 I am able to obtain relatively complete enrollment datafor health
plans licensed to do business in D.C.; these detailed data facffitateanaly-
ses of market share by consumer segment and product type. However,
CareFirst also sells policies in Maryland, Virginia, and Delaware. Acom-
plete analysis of the market power possessed by CareFirst wouldrequire
comparable analyses in these other geographic markets.An Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 143
D.C. Health Plan Enrollment.Table 5.1 reports the health plan
enrollment and market share for each health plan licensed to sell health
insurance policies in D.C. for the years 2000 and2001.13 In 2001, there
were a total of fourteen health plans, mostof which fall into one of
three categories. Four national for-profit companies (Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, AMERIGROUP, Cigna, and United Healthcare) did a small
amount of business in D.C. (combined market share ofroughly 10.1
percent). Three other health plans (George Washington University
Health Plan, Optimum Choice, and MD-Individual Practice
Association) could be characterized as relatively small regional plans
because they operated in a small number of adjacent states. In 2001,
these regional plans accounted for 15.6 percent of the market. Four
health plans (Health Right Inc., DC Chartered Health Plan, Advantage
Health Plan, and Capital Conununity Health Plan) offered products
only in D.C.; together these plans accounted for 3.5 percent of the
market.
Table 5.1
Health plan enrollment in the District of Columbia, 2000-2001
2001 2000
EnrollmentShareEnrollmentShare
Advantage Healthplan 3,194 0.00 3,471 0.00
Aetna U.S. Healthcare
(a Maryland corporation) 177,820 0.09 179,469 0.10
AME1GROUP Maryland, Inc. 12,876 0.01 12,640 0.01
Capital Community Health Plan 28,851 0.02 25,955 0.01
CareFirst BlueChoice Inc. 46,534 0.02 46,525 0.03
Cigna Healthcare Mid-Atlantic, Inc. 1,655 0.00 2,146 0.00
DC Chartered Health Plan, Inc. 26,877 0.01 27,687 0.01
GHMSI 924,798 0.48 879,338 0.47
GW University Health Plan 82,854 0.04 100,980 0.05
Health Right, Inc. 9,168 0.00 4,838 0.00
Kaiser of the Mid-Atlantic 376,877 0.20 389,349 0.21
MD-IPA, Inc. 171,207 0.09 130,064 0.07
Optimum Choice 44,233 0.02 25,612 0.01
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. 0 0.00 23,918 0.01
United Healthcare of the
Mid-Atlantic, Inc. 1,279 0.00 1,648 0.00
Total 1,908,223 1,853,640
Herfindahl 0.29 0.29144 Beaulieu
Omitted from this categorization are two CareFirst plans and the
Kaiser plan. CareFirst operates two health plans in D.C.: CareFirst
BlueChoice (hereafter BlueChoice) and Group Hospitalization and
Medical Services, Inc. (GHMSI). Together these plans represent 50.9
percent of the market; however, GHMSI, with a 48.5 percent share,
dominates in this market. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan has the sec-
ond largest share of the D.C. market (19.8 percent) and does not fit
neatly into any of the above three categories. It is affiliated with the
only national nonprofit health plan in the United States.
Total health plan enrollment in D.C. grew 2.9 percent from 2000 to
2001. All national for-profit plans (with the exception of AMERI-
GROUP, which gained 200 enrollees) lost market share over this time
period. Prudential Health Care operated a plan in 2000, but it termi-
nated this local plan in 2001 following its acquisition by Aetna Health
Plans. Two regional plans experienced substantial increases in enroll-
ment (MD-IPA grew by 41,000; Optimum Choice grew by 18,600); the
third regional health plan, George Washington University Health Plan,
lost roughly 18,000 enrollees. GHMSI experienced the largest absolute
enrollment gains during this period, adding more than 45,000 enrollees.
D.C. Enrollment by Consumer Segment. As shown in table 5.2,
health plans operating in D.C. sell policies to several differentcon-
sumer segments; however, enrollment in two of these segments (the
commercial group and Federal Employee Health Benefits Program
[FEHBP] segments) constitutes 91.5 percent of all health insurance
policies sold in D.C. The largest market segment is the commercial
group market, which accounts for 47 percent of all health insurance
policies; GHMSI and BlueChoice together hold a 51 percent share of
this segment. Commercial group products are typically sold to employ-
ers (large and small), who in turn offer these health plans as a benefit
to their employees at some fraction of the per-enrollee cost to the
employer.
The second largest segment is FEHBP; the FEHBP segment isvery
similar to the commercial group segment because the federal govern-
ment essentially acts as a large employer. One difference between these
two segments is that any health plan meeting a minimum set of crite-
ria may participate in FEHBP (i.e., offer a health plan to federal
employees); private-sector employers typically contract selectively
with a very small number of health plans. The FEHBP market segment



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































policies). Six health plans in D.C. offer a policy designed specifically for
federal employees, but GHMSI alone holds 51.7 percent of the market.
Health Plan Enrollment by Product Type.Managed-care companies
typically offer several different health insurance products in the com-
mercial group segment of the market. These products vary in terms of
the health care providers that members may receive care from and who
bears the risk that total premiums may not equal total expenses during
the time the policy is in effect. At one end of the spectrum is the HMO
product; for HMO policies, the managed-care company bears all the
risk and members are restricted to a prespecified provider network.14
At the other end of the spectrum is the indemnity product; for indem-
nity policies (which are rare today), the policyholder and the managed-
care company jointly share risk up to some maximum benefit.
Policyholders may receive care from any licensed provider.
Between these two extremes are preferred-provider-organization
(PPO) products and point-of-service (PUS) products. In both PPO and
PUS plans, the sponsoring managed-care company identifies a pre-
ferred list of providers. In the case of a PUS, this preferred list of
providers is usually the provider network for an HMO product; in the
case of a PPO, the preferred providers have entered into contracts with
the managed-care organization in which they have discounted the fees
they charge. When a member of a PPO or a PUS seeks care from a
provider not included on the preferred provider list, the member is
responsible for a co-insurance paymenta fixed percentage of the total
amount that the nonpreferred provider charges the health plan for his
or her services. When a member of a PUS plan receives care from a pre-
ferred provider, there is typically no co-insurance payment. When a
member of a PPU receives care from a preferred provider, there is typ-
ically a smaller co-insurance payment compared to the times when
services are obtained from a nonpreferred provider. Because of differ-
ences in their provider networks and their benefit design, PPU prod-
ucts are imperfect substitutes for HMO products. Table 5.3 provides a
brief description of different health insurance products.
Table 5.4 presents statistics on total health plan enrollment by prod-
uct type in 2001 for health plans operating in D.C.15 Approximately
71 percent of all health insurance products marketed by these health
plans in the D.C.-Maryland-Virginia region are HMU products. The
next largest category is the PPU product, which represents 21 percent
of all health insurance products sold in this region by health plans thatAn Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 147
Table 5.3














Enrollees are individuals who are not members of a con-
tracting group (i.e., they are enrolled under an individual
coverage option).
Enrollees are federal employees and participate in the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.
Includes individuals enrolled through employer-sponsored
group HMO policies, as well as conversion members (per-
Sons who are no longer members of an employer group but
under COBRA regulations are still eligible for HIVIO Services
at a group rate).
Recipients of Medicaid and Medicare who are enrolled in an
liMO.
Enrollees have access to arid financial incentives to use a
managed-care provider network, often the HMO's provider
panel, but in contrast to the open-panel HMO, POS enrollees
are not prepaid enrollees of the HMO (they pay indemnity
premiums).
Enrollees are prepaid members of the HMO and may receive
nonemergency services from providers outside the HMO's
network. A substantial deductible, copayment, or need for
coinsurance is usually required for use of nonpanel
providers.
A fee-for-service product where beneficiaries receive care
from a selected panel of providers. Providers agree to a dis-
counted fee schedule when contracting with the PPO. PPOs
offer a wide variety of benefit plans; some include the
option of using nonpanel providers if beneficiaries pay out-
of-pocket costs.
The insurer pays the cost of covered services after services
have been received and according to an agreed-on fee sched-
ule. Various managed-care tools such as precertification,
second surgical opinion, and utilization review are used.
The HMO providers deliver health services to an individual,
but rather than being prepaid enrollees or premium paying
beneficiaries, services received are paid for directly by the
enrollee's employer.
A Medicare wraparound plan that covers some co-payments,
deductibles, and services not covered under traditional
Medicare. Beneficiaries are given financial incentives to use
HMO providers but are not restricted to the HMO's panel.
This category primarily includes enrollees in flexcare
plans, self-insured Medicare plans, managed indemnity,





Total regional health plan enrollment in 2001, byproduct types
aTotal health plan enrollment excluding FEHBP enrollment.
participate in the D.C. market. Note that all health plans offer an HMO
product except for GHMSI, and that only GHMSI offers a PPO product
or an indemnity product. GHMSI does not compete with any other
managed-care firm in these two product markets and has the largest
market share (approximately 45 percent) in the PUS product market.
CareFirst BlueChoice membership represents an additional 24 percent
market share in the PUS product market.
Market Concentration.Economists frequently employ the Herfindahl
measure to quantify the extent to which market share is concentrated
in a small number of firms. The Herfindahl concentration measure is
computed as the sum of squared market shares for all firms in the mar-
HMO PPO POS IndemnityTotal
Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan 501,088 14,860 515,948
Prudential Health
Care Plan 0 0
Health Right, Inc. 9,168 9,168
Optimum Choice, Inc. 392,153 392,153
MD-Individual
Practice Assoc, Inc. 122,860 122,860
DC Chartered
Health Plan 26,877 26,877
United Healthcare 180,478 180,478
Capital Community
Health Plan 28,085 28,085
Amerigroup
Maryland, Inc. 131,430 131,430
Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. 369,004 36,396 405,400
Cigna Healthcare 32,589 4,485 37,074
GW University
Health Plan 59,545 3,882 63,427
CareFirst BlueChoice 123,372 45,572 168,944
GI-]IvISI 589,251 85,058 38,232 712,541
Advantage
Healthplan, Inc. 3,194 3,194
Total 1,979,843 589,251 190,253 38,232 2,797,579An Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 149
ket. If there is only one firm in the market (i.e., a monopoly), the
Herfindahi statistic equals 1.0. If there are two firms of equal size in the
market, the Herfindahi statistic equals 0.5. Economists are interested in
market concentration because they believe it is related to a firm's bar-
gaining power with suppliers and the ability of individual firms to
affect the price at which the market clears.
The Herfindahi statistic for the entire D.C. health insurance market
is 0.29, which is roughly equivalent to having three to four firms of
equal size in the market. In some more narrowly defined market seg-
ments, the Herfindahi statistics are substantially higher. For example,
the Herfindahi statistic in the individual market (policies sold to
individual consumers and not through a group purchaser) is 0.54;
GHMSI's share of this market is 72 percent. The Herfindahl statistic in
the FEHBP segment is 0.34, and GHMSI's market share is 52 percent. In
D.C., GHMSI is the only managed-care firm in the PPO and indemnity
market segments (Herfindahl = 1.0). Table 5.5 presents the Herfindahi
statistic and GHMSI's market share for each market segment in which
it participates.
Market Dynamics.Point-in-time statistics on enrollment and market
share provide an incomplete picture of the competitive nature of a mar-
ket. One might like to know which products, if any, have gained in
Table 5.5
Herfindahl statistics and GHIvISI market share for market segments, 2001
Commercial Group 0.30 0.47
FEHBP 0.34 0.52
Individual 0.54 0.72




aBecause enrollment by product type is reported only at the health plan level for the
entire II). C-Maryland-Virginia market area, the Herfindal and GHMSI market share sta-
tistics are difficult to interpret. It is possible that managed-care companies offer POS
products in Maryland and Virginia but not in the District of Columbia. This situation
would cause the Herfindahl and GHMSI market share statistics in Table 5.4 to overstate
the true measures. Perhaps in the District, GHIvISI is the only health plan offering a POS
product; in that case, the reported Herfindahl and GHMSI market share would underes-
timate the true measures.
Market segment Herfindahi GHMSI market share150 Beaulieu
popularity in recent years. Comparable historical data from health plan
filings with the D.C. insurance commission were not available to con-
struct a longtitudinal version of table 5.5. Enrol]ment by product type
was available, however, from the InterStudy database for the years
1999 and 2001 for any health plan offering an HMO.16
Table 5.6 reports changes in the sum total of enrollment by product
type for health plans that offer an HMO and whose primary service
area is the District of Columbia, Maryland, or Virginia. These enrollment
changes are also broken down by plan ownership type: national for-
profit, Virginia Blue Cross Blue Shield, independent (includes for-profit
and nonprofit), and CareFirst. A list of health plans in each ownership
category is included in table 5.7.
The largest decreases in total enrollment marketwide occurred in the
commercial group HMO product line and in the open-panel HMO
product line. The largest increases occurred in PPO enrollment and
enrollment in other non-HMO products. Data in table 5.6 suggest that
the national for-profit firms decreased enrollment in commercial group
HMO products and made up for about 83 percent of this HMO enroll-
ment decrease with enrollment increases in PPO and other non-HMO
Table 5.6
Changes in enrollment by product type in the D.C-Maryland-Virginia region, 1999-2001







FF0 645,149 101,435 0-1,011 355,443455,867
FEHBP 463,346 -13,142 1,74615,714 -7,055-2,737
Public 455,393 45,075 27,128-3,425 -125,900-57,122




non-HMO 275,474 245,378 026,306 0271,684
POS 146,220 -45,365 0 0 0-45,365
Direct 62,587 -9,927 -3,224-2,445 -750-16,346
FFS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Supplemental 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total





















































products. Unlike other health plans in the D.C.-Maryland-Virginia
market, CareFirst plans increased their commercial group HMO enroll-
ment but decreased enrollment in all other HMO products. These
decreases were more than offset, however, by large increases in PPO
enrollment and enrollment in self-insured products.
Comparable nationwide enrollment changes between 1999 and
2001 are presented in table 5.8. Similarities between trends in the
D.C.-Maryland-Virginia markets and nationwide include a substantial
increase in PPO enrollment, a substantial decrease in commercial
group and POS enrollment, and a decrease in nongroup direct enroll-
ment products. In contrast to nationwide enrollment trends, total man-
aged-care enrollment, FEHBP enrollment, and public program
enrollment decreased in plans offering an HMO in the D.C.-Maryland-
Virginia market, while they increased nationwide. Overall, however, it
National for-profit Virgim... Blue Independent
plans Cross Blue Shield plans CareFirst plans
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Table 5.7
InterStudy health plans by ownership type in the D.C.-Maryland-Virginia market, 2001152 Beaulieu
Table 5.8
Enrollment changes nationwide, 1999-2001




seems that enrollment trends in the D.C.-Maryland-Virginia market
area are similar to enrollment trends nationwide.
In summary, the market-share analysis indicates that the CareFirst
plan, GHMSI, dominates the D.C. health insurance market. GHMSI has
a large market share in the largest consumer segments. Furthermore,
the markets in which GHMSI dominates are also concentrated. This
combination suggests that GHMSI possesses market power in D.C. The
next largest plan in the D.C. market is the Kaiser plan; note that the
national for-profit health plans that CareFirst managers perceive as
their primary competitors hold relatively small market shares in D.C.
Because the market structure analyses were limited to the D.C. market,
it is not possible to speculate whether other CareFirst plans possess
similar favorable positions in the Maryland and Delaware markets.
National and local enrollment trends suggest a decline in traditional
HMO and POS products and increases in PPO and other non-HMO
products. CareFirst plans are at the forefront of this trend in the FF0
Commercial
Group HMO 46,722 -4,429 73 1,384-1,172 -4,144
PPO 36,324 4,376 817 6,917 2,289 14,399
FEHBP 2,362 -114 128 20 63 97
Public
programs 17,746 -581 1,295-1,002 1,174 886
Self-insured 6,759 -98 749 697 -280 1,068
Open-ended
HMO 8,563 -164 14 257 -381 -273
Other
non-HMO 6,879 3,108 575 115 427 4,225
POS 6,637 -895 -423 -1,640 111 -2,848
Direct pay 1,562 -256 114 -213 -121 -475
Managed FFS 2,334 -79 -107 900 309 1,023
Supplemental
Medicare 1,040 -21 305 445 73 803
Total
managed care 137,998 858 3,631 7,917 2,619 15,025An Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 153
market, but they lag behind the national for-profit firms in the market
for other non-HMO products.
Economies of Scale.CareFirst executives and consultants have
argued that the firm's acquisition by Weilpoint will lower CareFirst
costs because of economies of scale. Strictly speaking, economies of
scale are present when average unit costs fall with increased output.
Average unit costs may decrease over some range of output for two
reasons. First, large capital investments represent fixed costs that lead
naturally to declining average costs up to some capacity constraint.
Second, marginal costs may fall over some range of output because of
learning curves, specialization, or volume discounts from suppliers.
In the health insurance market, economies of scale are present when
the average total cost of insuring an individual is lower with high lev-
els of total health plan enrollment than with low levels of total plan
enrollment. Several intuitive reasons can explain why economies of
scale might be present in managed-care operations. First, insurance is
largely an information business and requires substantial capital invest-
ment in computers and software to manage that information. As long
as the information systems are not at some capacity constraint, the
information technology (IT) costs of processing information for an
additional enrollee is essentially zero; hence, health plans can lower
average costs by spreading these fixed costs of capital investment over
a larger enrollment base. In a similar vein, health plans with a larger
enrollment base may be able to support a larger Research and
Development (R&D) group and have more opportunities for lower cost
experimentation with new products and processes. Fixed costs are also
associated with negotiating contracts with health care providers and
purchasers.
Second, greater health plan enrollment may increase the bargaining
power that the health plan can exercise in its negotiations over reim-
bursements with health care providers (e.g., doctors, hospitals, and
pharmaceutical companies). The extent to which increased enrollment
translates into greater bargaining power and lower medical-care costs
(and hence lower average total costs) depends on local market charac-
teristics. In markets where providers are themselves consolidated into
large bargaining units or in which the demand for certain types of
providers (e.g., high-quality teaching hospitals) is strong, the health
plan's financial return to greater enrollment that derives from
increased bargaining power is lower.154 Beaulieu
A third potential source of economies of scale in health insurance
relates to the amount of financial reserves that a health plan must hold
to meet statutory requirements. For statistical reasons, the per-enrollee
amount of financial reserves that a health plan is required to hold is
less for health plans with larger enrollment bases.
If we define economies of scale as average costs falling with
increased enrollment, then it is possible to test for the presence of
economies of scale in health insurance using a data set on health plan
costs, enrollment, and other characteristics. The following paragraphs
report the results of such an analysis.
Most states require health insurance plans to file quarterly and/or
annual reports with the state insurance commissioner using a com-
mon format created by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). These data are publicly available. The Weiss
Ratings Company collects and compiles these data and sells reports
based on them. In the data compiled by the Weiss Ratings Company
are reports of total health plan administrative expenditures, total
health plan medical expenditures, total health plan enrollment, and
several characteristics of the health plan and the insurance products
it markets.
The sample for analysis was created by selecting all health plans
classified as HMOs in the Weiss data reporting positive enrollment in
2001. These selection criteria yielded a sample size of 439 health plans.
Health plans that enrolled Medicare beneficiaries (eleven plans) or
Medicaid beneficiaries (sixty plans) exclusively were dropped from the
analysis. Health plans reporting fewer than 5,000 enrollees (twenty-
seven plans, five of which were Medicaid-only or Medicare-only plans)
were also dropped from the sample. The remaining health plans were
matched with the InterStudy database to collect additional information
about the plans (321 matches out of the final Weiss sample of 347).
Missing data for variables used as regressors led to a final sample size
of 299 plans.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show substantial variation among health plans in
administrative and medical expenses per member. The correlation
between administrative and medical expenses is positive but not very
large (correlation coefficient = 0.55). There is no reason to expect that
economies of scale in administrative expenses would be the same as
economies of scale in medical expenses. In fact, the earlier discussion
suggests different sources of economies of scale in the two types of













for economies of scale in medical expenses and administrative
expenses.
Figure 5.6 is a frequency distribution of health plan enrollment. This
distribution is heavily skewed to the left; there is a relatively small
number of plans with a very large enrollment (i.e., more than 500,000
enrollees). Note that 56 percent of health plans in this sample have
HMO enrollment under 100,000 members (on the lower end of the plan
size distribution). One indication of the presence of economies of scale
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plans in the top enrollment decile. If economies of scale were present,
one would expect to see an overrepresentation ofthese high-
enrollment plans in the lowest deciles for average per-member medical
and administrative expenses. Figure 5.7 suggests that this expectation
is not the case; the high-enrollment plans are evenly represented in the
administrative expense deciles and overrepresented in the higher
medical expense deciles.
Figure 5.8 is a scatterplot of administrative expenses per member
compared to health plan enrollment. Although many health plans are
clustered in the low enrollment/low administrative expense quad-
rant of the graph, there does appear to be a negative relationship
between average administrative expense and enrollment. In contrast,
there appears to be no relationship discernible from the scatterplot of
per-member medical expenses and enrollment (see figure 5.9).
Several health plan characteristics could influence average adminis-
trative and medical expenses independent of scale. Accounting prac-
tices in nonprofit health plans tend to result in a larger number of
expenses classified as administrative compared tothose in for-profit
health plans. The average administrative and medical expenditures
may differ by product line because of the variation in costsof deliver-
ing care to enrollees in different market segments. The InterStudy data
records enrollment in several different product lines, including com-
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Plot of economies of scale in medical expenses
Medicaid risk HMO, POS, PPO, and FFS. In addition to the types of
products offered by health plans, the total number of productsmay
be positively related to average administrative costs. Because differ-
ent product lines require product-specific investments in marketing,
regulatory compliance, and provider networks, health plans concen-
trating their enrollment in fewer products are more likely to experi-
ence lower administrative expenses and possibly greater economies
of scale.
Administrative and medical expenses per member may also be
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four basic types of provider networks: (1) the staff model, in which
physicians are employed by the health plan and are located in a small
number of clinics; (2) the group model, in which health plans
contract with physicians practicing in medical groups that may also
contract with other health plans; (3) the Independent Physician
Association (IPA) model, in which physicians in solo and group prac-
tice contract with an intermediary (the IPA), which in turn contracts
with one or more health plans; and (4) the network model, in which
health plans contract directly (not through an IPA) with a mix of solo-
practice and group-practice physicians. Today, the provider networks
of most health plans are a mix of these four model types. The organi-
zation of the health plan's provider network is related to, but not iden-
tical to, the breadth of the network (measured as the number of
physicians per member). Health plans with predominantly IPA-based
networks also tend to have larger networks.
Health plans contracting with a large number of providers for a
given membership size will likely have larger administrative costs per
member because of the additional transaction costs involved in negoti-
ating and executing a larger number of contracts. It is also plausible
that health plans with larger provider networks (controlling for mem-
bership size) will have higher medical expenses per member for three
reasons: (1) adverse selection, (2) the health planwill find it more diffi-
cult to control utilization with a larger network and a smaller number
of enrollees per provider, and (3) the health plan will be less able to
negotiate lower provider reimbursement rates when providers see few
of the plan's enrollees.
In addition to the network characteristics discussed in previous
paragraphs, the method of provider payment may influence average
administrative and medical costs. Consider two primary reimbursement
methods: fee-for-service and capitation. Fee-for-service reimbursement
requires the processing of a claim and payment on a claim to an indi-
vidual physician every time a service is delivered. In contrast, capita-
tion reimbursement sometimes involves no filing and processing of
individual claims and only a monthly per-member payment to the
physician or the practice. In some cases, health plans employing capi-
tation require providers to submit dummy claims that the health plan
then processes, but the health plan still makes payments less fre-
quently. It is also likely that capitation reduces per-member medical
costs.160 Beaulieu
In the last decade, there has been substantial consolidation of enroll-
ment into a relatively small number of national and regional health
plans. A statistical analysis of the relationship between local health plan
enrollment and local health plan expenditures (both medical and
administrative) that failed to account for affiliation with a national man-
aged-care company might underestimate the true extent of economies
of scale.'7 Affiliation with a national or regional managed-care company
should convey economies of scale to a local plan to the extent that the
cost of centralized services (i e, claims processing) can be spread over a
national or regional enrollment base.
Finally, a health plan's medical and administrative expensesmay
depend on the characteristics of the local health care markets in which
it operates. There is substantial geographical variation in the organiza-
tion of the provider sector, regulatory environment, and the extent of
mandated benefits that could lead to differences in health plan cost
structures.
Any one of these health plan or market characteristics could havean
impact on average health plan administrative and medical expendi-
tures. To assess empirically whether economies of scale exist in health
plan enrollment, it is necessary to control statistically for these other fac-
tors. Consequently a regression analysis was undertaken to assess the
relationship between health plan enrollment and average per-member
administrative and medical expenses.
Table 5.9 presents the results of two regression analyses. In column
2, the dependent variable is administrative costs per member; in
colunm 3, the dependent variable is average medical costsper member.
A fixed effect for the health plan's primary state of operation (the state
in which the health plan had the greatest enrollment) was included in
each regression to control for regional variation in expenses. The esti-
mated coefficients presented in columns 2 and 3 indicate that small
but significant economies of scale are present in both administrative
expenses and medical expenses. Because both the dependent variable
and the enrollment variables are measured in natural logs, the coeffi-
cients on the enrollment variables in the regression may be interpreted
as elasticities (e.g., the percentage change in administrative expenses
associated with a one percentage change in enrollment). The estimatedAn Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 161
Table 5.9














Medicare risk 1.54 (0.22) al.78 (0.26)
Medicaid risk c0.28 (0.16) -0.27 (0.18)
Direct pay 0.07 (0.41) a_0.83 (0.28)
FEHBP -0.25 (0.45) 0.14 (0.34)
CommercialHMO -0.16 (0.14) -0.30 (0.20)
POS a074 (0.21) b044(0.22)
PPO 0.04 (0.14) c0.56 (0.29)
Supplemental Medicare 2.36 (1.75) 0.85 (0.97)
FFS 0.65 (0.55) -0.29 (0.41)
Percentage provider payment-
Capitation -0.12 (0.14) -0.12 (0.12)
Fee-for-service 0.05 (0.09) -0.03 (0.13)
Provider payment imputation c_0.31 (0.19) -0.31 (0.24)
Product Herfindahl 0.12 (0.18) 0.28 (0.20)
Age of plan 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Physicians per 1,000 enrollees a47534 (152.54) a796.89 (208.74)
Log of enrollment b..005(0.03) b..064(0.03)
Log of national managed-care
enrollment -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)
Log of regional managed-care
enrollment 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
For-profit lIMO b016(0.08) -0.01 (0.06)
Percentage of enrollment in
IPA or mixed model b014(0.06) b013(0.06)
Number of products 0.00 (0.02) aO.07 (0.02)
Number of states 0.13 (0.11) 0.15 (0.14)
Constant a5.82 (0.29) a7.85 (0.29)
State dummy variables Included Included
Number of observations 299 299
R-squared 0.50 0.54162 Beaulieu
coefficient on within-plan enrollment is 0.05 for administrative
expenses and 0.06 for medical expenses, indicating that a one per-
centage increase in the health plan's enrollment is associated witha .05
to .06 percentage point decrease in average administrative and medical
costs, respectively. These estimated relationships are depicted in
figures 5.10 and 5.11.
Recall that, for pians affiliated with national or regional managed-
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separately into the regression. The coefficients on these variables indi-
cate the extent to which the additional scale (enrollment) present in a
national or regional managed-care company is associated with higher
or lower administrative expenses per member in the local plan. The
point estimates on these enrollment variables in both regressions are
essentially zero and insignificant.
Given the topic of this paper, it is worthwhile to note that this regres-
sion analysis suggests that nonprofit health plans have significantly
higher per-member administrative costs but not significantly different
average medical costs. As noted earlier, however, this finding may be
an artifact of nonprofit accounting customs.
In summary, the regression analysis finds evidence of modest
economies of scale in both administrative and medical costs. The esti-
mated economies of scale are nearly exhausted at an enrollment of
roughly 800,000. Only twelve health plans in our sample have an
enrollment greater than this number. In addition, it appears that there
are no additional economies of scale to be gained through membership
in a regional or national managed-care company.
Quality of Care.Consumers, providers, managers, and researchers
all acknowledge that quality in health care is multidimensional and
difficult to measure. These characteristics of quality lead to difficulties
in contracting for a specified level of quality and to challenges in hold-
ing individuals and organizations accountable for the quality of health
care services delivered. Quality of care arises as an issue in health plan
conversions because of the potential opportunity and financial incen-
tive for a for-profit health plan to skimp on the aspects of quality that
are difficult for consumers to observe and verify.
Differences in quality between health plans do exist and are some-
times large. For example, the Centers for Disease Control estimates that
nearly 16 million Americans have diagnosed or undiagnosed diabetes.
If not properly managed, diabetes can have devastating health conse-
quences and can consume lots of expensive health care resources. To
manage their disease, people with diabetes and their physicians must
know the level of the patient's hemoglobin Alc (HbAlc), and this
information is obtained through a simple blood test. In the sample of
plans reporting data to the National Committee on Quality Assurance
in 2000, the percentage of diabetic plan members who had their HbAlc
tested ranged from 24 percent to 97 percent. This range suggests sub-
stantial variation in performance and ample room for improvement.164 Beaulieu
Research has shown that health plans that undertake diabetes disease
management programs can effect substantial improvements in care
and short-term outcomes for people with diabetes.
Published health services research documents correlations between
health plan performance on some quality measures and various health
plan characteristics.18 Although the root causes of these patterns are not
well understood, local independent and nonprofit health plans fre-
quently outperform for-profit, publicly traded, national managed-care
plans. These findings are important for public officials to consider as
they determine whether particular conversions are in the interest of
health care consumers. In the following section, I compare the per-
formance of CareFirst, Wellpoint, and other health plans operating in
their respective markets on various measures of health plan quality.
Measures of Health Plan Quality.In 1997, the National Committee on
Quality Assurance (NCQA) began reporting the performance of some
health plans on a selected set of quality measures. This set of measures
(the Health plan and Employers Data Information Set [HEDIS]) was
chosen by a group of health care purchasers and medical professionals
arid has been expanded over the years. Health plans voluntarily sub-
mit performance data (most is audited) to the NCQA, which then pub-
lishes these data in a product called Quality Compass. Consumers and
employers have used these data to help them make health care pur-
chasing decisions; academic researchers have used these data to study
the causes of variation in health plan quality.
The HEDIS measures convey information about the extent to which
the health plan's enrollees are obtaining preventive services and diag-
nostic tests necessary for managing certain chronic diseases. (See table
5.10 for a list of HEDIS measures used in the analyses presented in this
paper.) The HEDIS set also includes a few measures of health care
Table 5.10
Definitions of HEDIS quality measures
Adolescent
immunization rates
Rate of advising smokers
to quit
Estimates the percentage of adolescent health plan
members that have been verified to have received all
required doses of several vaccines by their thirteenth
birthday.
Measures the percentage of eligible health plan members
who were advised to quit smoking during a visit with a






















Evaluates whether health plan members who are
suffering from persistent asthma are being prescribed
medications deemed acceptable by the National Heart,
Lung and Blood Institute as primary therapy for long-term
control of asthma.
Estimates the percentage of members age 35 and older
who are hospitalized and discharged from the hospital
after surviving a heart attack (defined as an acute
myocardial infarction [AMI]) and who received a
prescription for a beta blocker.
Estimates the percentage of women age 52 through 69
who are enrolled in a health plan and who had a mam-
mogram during the measurement year or the year prior
to the measurement year.
Estimates the percentage of women age 21 to 64 who
were enrolled in a health plan and who had an
Papanicolau (Pap) test during the measurement year or
the two years prior.
Estimates the percentage of children who were enrolled
in managed-care plans, turned two years old during the
measurement year, and had received vaccinations:
four doses of DTP or DtaP (diptheria-tetanus),
three doses of OPV or IPV (polio), (3) one dose of
MMR (measles-mumps-rubella), (4) two doses of Hib
(Haemophilus influenza), (5) three doses of Hepatitis B,
and (6) one dose of VZV (chicken pox).
Estimates the percentage of sexually active female plan
members who had at least one test for chiamydia dur-
ing the measurement year. The measure is collected
separately for women age 16 to 20 and 21 to 26.
Measure set includes several important features of
effective, multphasic management of diabetes and its
complications. The measure estimated the percentage of
health plan members with Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes
who were 18 to 75 years old and during the measurement
year had (1) a hemoglobin Alc (HbAlc) test, (2) poorly
controlled HbAlc (level greater that 9.5%), (3) a serum
cholesterol level (LDL-C) screening, (4) their cholesterol
level (LDL-C) controlled to less than 130 mg/dl, (5) an
eye exam, and (6) a screening for kidney disease.
Indicates the percentage of health plan members age six
and older who received inpatient treatment for a mental
health disorder and had an ambulatory or day/night
follow-up visit after being discharged.
Measures timeliness of prenatal care and postpartum
care.166 Beaulieu
outcomes for the health plan's enrolled population that signal how well
the health plan is doing overall at helping its members stay healthy.
The second set of measures of health plan quality is derived from a
survey instrument called the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans
Survey (CAHPS); CAHPS data are included in Quality Compass. The
survey is administered by an independent party to a random sample of
the health plan's enrollees to collect data on consumers' experiences in
seeking and obtaining health care. Health plans often submit their per-
formance on CAHPS to organizations that publish comparative health
plan data (such as the federal government, the NCQA, and local health
care purchasing groups). The federal government has mandated the
collection and reporting of these survey data for Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in Medicare HMOs.
The CAHPS instrument generates hard-to-find data on the quality of
enrollees' interactions with providers and health plans. (See Table 5.11
for a list of CAHPS measures used in the analyses presented in this
report.) Health plans can take many actions to facilitate consumers'
access to care, to educate consumers about and involve them in their
own health care, to ease the administrative burden of dealing with
insurance claims, and to select and support a provider network that
routinely delivers high-quality patient-friendly care. The CAHPS
measures provide health plans with an opportunity to distinguish
themselves in these areas.
HEDIS Comparisons.CareFirst operates three separate health plans in
the mid-Atlantic region that reported 1999 HEDIS data to NCQA (the
data are published in Quality Compass 2000): CapitalCare Inc.,
Delmarva Health Plan Inc., and FreeState Health Plan Inc. In the analy-
ses that follow, an average score is computed for all three CareFirst
plans weighted by FIMO enrollment. Wellpoint operates the Blue Cross
of California (BC-CA) health plan in California; this plan reported a
limited set of 1999 HEDIS data to NCQA. Performance on HEDIS
measures may be influenced by some factors beyond the health plan's
control, such as sociodemographic characteristics of the plan's mem-
bership, local organization of providers, and state health initiatives. To
control for variation in some of these factors across markets, the HEDIS
scores of each plan have been adjusted for the region of the country in
which the health plan operates.
Table 5.12 presents HEDIS data comparing the average performance
of the CareFirst plans to Welipoint's California plan and to the nationalAn Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 167
Table 5.11







Measures timeliness of services received from health care
providers in the last twelve months.
Measures managed-care enrollees' experiences with submitting
claims to their health plans in the last twelve months.
Measures how difficult it was for enrollees in managed care
plans to obtain information and to complete paperwork in the
last twelve months.
Measures the consumers' experiences while seeing a doctor or
health care provider in the last twelve months.
A composite measure consisting of several questions related to
consumers' experiences in attempting to obtain care from
doctors and specialists.
Measures managed-care enrollees' perception of quality of
customer service when interacting with staff in their doctors'
offices and clinics in the last twelve months.
Respondents were asked to rate their personal doctor or nurse
with 0 ("worst personal doctor or nurse possible") to 10 ("best
personal doctor or nurse possible").
Respondents who had seen a specialist physician in the last
twelve months were asked to rate their specialist with 0 ("worst
specialist possible") to 10 ("best specialist possible").
Respondents were asked to rate their health plan with 0 ("worst
health plan possible") to 10 ("best health plan possible").
Respondents were asked to rate the quality of the health care
they received in the last twelve months, with 0 ("worst health
care possible") to 10 ("best health care possible").
average on three types of measures: preventive care, chronic care, and
mental health care. CareFirst performs least well on the preventive-care
measures; its scores exceed the national average on four out of ten
measures, and BC-CA outperforms CareFirst on six out of the seven
measures for which data were submitted by BC-CA. The second group
of measures relates to care for enrollees with chronic disease. BC-CA
reported only one out of eight measures in this group, and its perform-
ance on this measure falls significantly below CareFirst's performance.
CareFirst outperforms the national average on six out of eight meas-
ures in the chronic-care category. Finally, in the third group of measures
relating to mental health care, CareFirst outperforms BC-CA on the two
measures for which Weilpoint submitted data. CareFirst outperformed












Comparison of CareFirst and Wellpoirit plans on HEDIS measures
These comparisons between the CareFirst plans and the Welipoint-
CA plan suggest that each of these plans has strengths and weaknesses
and that neither plan dominates the other on HEDIS measures. Note
that at least one CareFirst plan reported data for every HEDIS measure
(twenty-three measures in all), while the Wellpoint-CA plan reported
data on just less than half of the measures. The collection and public
reporting of plan performance on HEDIS measures signals a plan's
commitment to improving health care quality.
Table 5.13 facilitates a comparison of performance by CareFirst and
Weilpoint-CA on HEDIS measures to the Kaiser plans operating in the
CareFirst and Wellpoint-CA markets. The Kaiser Foundation is the









Child immunization 1 77.6 68.4 65.9 65.7 13.0
Child immunization 2 65.6 48.7 47.6 11.7
Adol immunization 1 24.7 27.4 33.2 28.7 17.7
Adolimmunization2 16.7 15.6 12.4 11.9
Advice to quit smoking 70.1 60.8 64.7 62.3 6.9
Breast cancer screening 70.6 75.9 74.9 72.6 5.9
Cervical cancer screening 68.4 70.1 73.7 71.8 7.7
Prenatal care 85.1 87.3 86.4 86.8 11.1
Checkup after delivery 69.3 79.1 74.6 73.7 11.8
Beta blockers 85.5 86.9 86.5 87.2 9.7
Chronic care
Cholesterol rate 18.8 47.8 45.1 15.0
Cholesterol screening 70.7 70.2 67.8 11.1
HbAlc test 79.1 77.3 76.3 8.9
Diabetic eye exam 58.8 39.5 48.5 44.7 14.3
Lipid profile 68.0 70.4 69.7 9.9
Lipid control 44.8 38.6 35.8 9.6
Nephropathy monitoring 38.1 37.3 35.7 14.4
HbAlc control 79.7 58.0 55.3 14.3
Mental health care
Mental illness-7 days 60.6 45.0 49.2 49.6 14.7
Mental ilJness-30 days 72.0 50.5 72.3 70.9 13.7
Depression contact 8.7 21.3 19.9 10.3
Depression, acute 68.9 60.3 61.3 9.5
Depression, continuous 45.2 43.6 43.2 10.4An Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 169
Table 5.13
Comparison of BCBS plans to Kaiser plans on HEDIS measures
plan in the United States. All other nonprofit managed-care companies
have only a local or a regional presence. The Kaiser Foundation plans
in California and the mid-Atlantic region reported a full set of 1999
HEDIS data to NCQA.
Comparing the second and third columns of table 5.13, note that
Kaiser of the Mid-Atlantic outperforms CareFirst on nearly every
HEDIS measure (nineteen out of twenty-three). Second, comparing the
third and fourth columns of the table, note that the Kaiser plans of
California outperform Welipoint on nearly every measure for which
Welipoint reported data (ten out of eleven). Finally, Kaiser Mid-Atlantic
outperforms Kaiser California on sixteen out of the twenty-three meas-
ures. This comparison of the two Kaiser plans raisesthe concern that the







Child immunization 1 77.6 88.6 68.4 76.2
Child immunization 2 65.6 76.5 69.5
Adol immunization 1 24.7 48.4 27.4 34.5
Adol immunization 2 16.7 50.2 16.6
Advice to quit smoking 70.1 67.6 60.8 68.0
Breast cancer screening 70.6 79.4 75.9 75.8
Cervical cancer screening 68.4 88.6 70.1 77.4
Prenatal care 85.1 86.9 87.3 89.5
Check-up after delivery 69.3 80.1 79.1 83.2
Beta blockers 85.5 98.3 86.9 89.7
Chronic care
Cholesterol rate 18.8 67.5 45.2
Cholesterol screening 70.7 75.3 78.4
HbAlc test 79.1 85.9 77.5
Diabetic eye exam 58.8 87.7 39.5 64.0
Lipid profile 68.0 69.2 70.5
Lipid control 44.8 41.9 41.2
Nephropathy monitoring 38.1 74.8 55.2
HbAlc control 79.7 71.1 55.1
Mental health care
Mental illness-7 days 60.6 65.5 45.0 62.6
Mental illness-30 days 72.0 79.2 50.5 83.3
Depression contact 8.7 34.6 28.4
Depression, acute 68.9 63.8 68.6
Depression, continuous 45.2 46.1 58.2170 Beaulieu
not completely successful. However, the magnitude of the differences
between the Kaiser plans and CareFirst and Welipoint plans suggests
systematic differences even within a region.
In summary, three major conclusions emerge from these compar-
isons on HEDIS measures. First, the CareFirst and the BC-CA plans
each have strengths and weaknesses on HEDIS measures, and neither
plan dominates the other. BC-CA compares favorablyon preventive-
care measures, while the CareFirst plans compare favorably on
chronic-care and mental-health-care measures. Second, both the
BC-CA plan and the CareFirst plans are outperformed by the Kaiser
plans in their respective markets on HEDIS measures.
CAHPS comparisons.This section of the report presents comparisons
of the performance of several health plans on the set of CAHPScom-
posite measures published in Quality Compass 2000. Examination of
table 5.14 shows that the CareFirst plans outperform the BC-CA plan
on eight out of ten CAHPS measures (the plans are essentially equal on
two measures). The largest differences between the health plans' per-
formance relate to access to care-getting care quickly and getting
needed care. Table 5.13 also facilitates a comparison of the BC-CA and
CareFirst plans to the national average. BC-CA performs below the
Table 5.14








Claims processing 83.0 81.1 79.1 76.4 9.2
Courteous staff 90.7 88.8 91.6 90.7 2.7
Customer service 66.0 64.9 65.8 63.0 6.3
Getting care quickly 78.1 67.6 79.2' 77.8 5.4
Getting needed care 77.2 70.6 75.4 72.7 6.8
Communication with
doctor 91.2 86.2 89.8 88.9 2.9
Overall health care
rating 68.5 68.4 71.1 68.8 6.1
Overall health plan
rating 59.2 56.0 58.0 53.5 8.4
Overall PCP rating 74.0 74.2 73.5 73.2 4.4
Overall specialist
rating 75.5 67.4 75.3 74.6 4.8An Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 171
national average on eight out of ten CAHPS measures;CareFirst per-
forms better than the national average on seven outof ten measures.
Also note that the average for national, publiclytraded, for-profit health
plans is below the average for all plans nationally.
The Kaiser Mid-Atlantic plan outperforms theCareFirst plans on
two out of the ten CAHPS measures, in contrast,the Kaiser California
plan outperforms the BC-CA plan on nine out of ten measures(see
table 5.15).
In summary, the analysis of CAHPS quality measures suggeststhat
CareFirst members have had more favorable experiencesin obtaining
health care services compared to the Weilpointplan in California.
Comparisons to local Kaiser plans in each marketreinforce the find-
ings of the head-to-head comparison ofBC-CA and the CareFirst
plans.
Postscript in the CareFirst Conversion Case
The Maryland insurance commissioner, Stephen Larsen,initiated hear-
ings on CareFirst's conversion petition prior tothe insurance commis-
sioners in the District of Columbia andDelaware. As part of the
Maryland hearings and in anticipation of formal hearings inD.C., sev-
eral consultants were hired to value CareFirst; mostof these valuations
exceeded Weilpoint's offer of $1.3 billion. In the courseof the hearings,
concerns were also raised aboutthe process used by the board of
Table 5.15








Claims processing 83.0 66.0 81.1 79.1
Courteous staff 90.7 90.5 88.8 90.3
Customer service 66.0 77.4 64.9 73.0
Getting care quickly 78.1 80.0 67.6 76.0
Getting needed care 77.2 76.2 70.6 78.8
Communication with doctor 91.2 82.2 86.2 87.0
Overall health care rating 68.5 65.2 68.4 70.3
Overall health plan rating 59.2 57.3 56.0 64.5
Overall PCP rating 74.0 72.4 74.2 75.0
Overall specialist rating 75.5 71.3 67.4 75.3172 Beaulieu
CareFirst to solicit bids and the board's selection of the Weilpoint offer.
Finally, the terms of the deal appeared to enrich CareFirstexecutives
personally.
On March 5, 2003, Commissioner Larson denied the petition by
CareFirst to convert to for-profit status and to be acquiredby
Wellpoint. Both the District of Columbia and Delawaresuspended
their conversion proceedings. In reviewing the research andevidence,
Commissioner Larson found three reasons to deny theconversion.
First, he found that CareFirst had been operating likea for-profit com-
pany despite legal requirements to adhere to a nonprofit, public-inter-
est mission. Second, he found that the CareFirst board failedto
consider CareFirst's obligations as a nonprofit entity, and thatthe
board did not negotiate the best price for CareFirst andwas offering to
sell at less than fair market value. Third, and finally, Commissioner
Larson found that CareFirst did not demonstratea need to convert to
for-profit status to remain viable.
On April 8, 2003, the Maryland legislature ratified Larsen's decision
and passed Senate bill 772. In essence, the bill isan attempt to restruc-
ture CareFirst as a functioning nonprofit health plan that willexecute
its mission. It calls for replacement of all Maryland-appointed
CareFirst board members and compensation to be paidto board mem-
bers, officers and employees to be comparable to similarpositions in
other nonprofit organizations. It establishesa joint nonprofit health
service plan oversight committee to oversee CareFirst operations ina
manner consistent with the interests of Maryland citizens, and it pro-
hibits the acquisition of CareFirst for fiveyears. In terms of health plan
conduct, it requires that CareFirst (1) offer healthcare products in the
individual and small-group markets, (2) administer and subsidizethe
Senior Prescription Drug Program in Maryland, and (3) devoteany
remaining avoided taxes to a public-interest project.
Far from closing the chapter on CareFirst's petitionto convert, the
Maryland legislation sparked controversy in the District of Columbia
and action by some of the parties. The D.C. insurancecommissioner
claimed that the Maryland legislation could render theCareFirst plan
in D.C. uncompetitive and not viable. The Blue Cross and BlueShield
Association revoked CareFirst's use of the BCBS brand. Finally,
Weilpoint abandoned hopes of acquiring CareFirst and announceda
deal to acquire the publicly traded holdingcompany of BCBS of
Wisconsin.An Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 173
IV.Summary and Suggestions for FutureResearch
The health insurance industry has undergonesubstantial consolidation
in recent years. This consolidation hascoincided with, and in part been
caused by, the growth of for-profit, publicly tradedhealth insurance
companies. These changes in health insurancemarkets have led indus-
try and government leaders toquestion the current and potential role
of nonprofit health plans. Some of these leadersbelieve that many, if
not all, nonprofit health plans arealready conducting themselves like
their for-profit competitors and hence questionthe value of giving a tax
exemption to these plans. Among peopleholding this view, however,
there is little agreement about what shouldbe done when these non-
profit health plans apply for conversion tofor-profit public-stock com-
panies. The lack of agreement derives fromuncertainty about the
viability of nonprofit health plans in a marketdominated by for-profit
plans and from ignorance about governance structuresthat could hold
nonprofit health plans (or foundations) accountable to apublic-interest
mission.
The governance structures necessary to implement apublic-interest
mission consistently, and the viability of anonprofit health plan exe-
cuting such a mission, form the foundation onwhich the welfare con-
sequences of potential changes inthe conduct of a converting health
plan should be evaluated. The welfare consequencesof conduct
changes must be evaluated in conjunctionwith the set of feasible alter-
native institutions for executing thepublic-interest mission. For exam-
ple, it may be that a converting healthplan would abandon
unprofitable markets and raise premiums in othermarkets. Denying
the petition to convert does not ensure, however,that unprofitable
markets will be better served or that premium increaseswill be limited
to cost increases; furthermore, it doesnot ensure that the nonprofit plan
will survive or otherwise be financially capableof these tasks.
Health policy makers are in need of economicresearch to answer a
few basic questions. First, how might unregulatedmarket competition
thwart a nonprofit health plan in executing itsmission? In other words,
what are the threats to viability? Second, whatmarket interventions
might ensure viability of the mission? Onlyafter these questions are
answered can one then pose the social value question:is the mission
worth it? To answer this question, economists andothers will have to
assess the costs and benefitsof alternative regulatory institutions.
Finally, creating a conducive environment for anonprofit health plan is174 Beaulieu
not sufficient. Policy makers need empirical and theoreticalresearch on
the types of governance structures that will guide faithfulexecution of
the nonprofit health plan's mission.
While research and experience have identified importantgaps in our
knowledge, economic analyses have made valuablecontributions to
the evaluation of conversions. Thecase study analysis of CareFirst con-
firms prior research findings that differences inhealth plan quality
related to ownership structure exist. To enhance theusefulness of these
findings, we need to understand the causal mechanismsunderlying
the correlation between quality and health plan characteristics.We do
not know, for instance, whether nonprofit plans have higher qualityon
average because they consider this part of their mission and allocate
surplus to achieve this higher qualityor because the organization of
nonprofit health plans differs from for-profit health plans inways that
facilitate higher quality at the same cost. Ofcourse, these explanation
are not the only two possible, and additional research is neededto
identify and articulate the mechanisms by which healthplans influence
quality.
The analyses of the economies of scale presented in thischapter have
generated evidence of the relationship between health plansize and
average costs. In the case of CareFirst, with over 3.1 million members,
little or no cost savings seems to be achievedthrough expanded
enrollment. This finding calls into question CareFirst'sclaim that it
needs greater access to capital to be able to finance futurehealth plan
acquisitions.
Finally, the market structure analyses demonstrate theimportance
of examining distinct product andconsumer market segments.
Market-share analyses for the District of Columbiasuggest that the
CareFirst plan, GHMSI, possesses substantial marketpower in some
segments. Whether GHMSI was exercising self-restraint in pricing the
policies it sold in this market was not possibleto determine from
the available data. Note that health plancosts by product would be
necessary to assess price-cost margins and that cost data forevery
product would be necessary to evaluatea health plan's strategy to
cross-subsidize.
The findings presented in thispaper are subject to several caveats
and limitations. First, because of its limitedscope, several health policy
issues are not addressed by this study. One exampleis the participation
by nonprofit health plans in traditionally underservedmarkets. In
addition, lack of data prohibited a careful examinationof health planAn Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 175
underwriting practices and health planproviderrelationships.
Second, it was beyond the scope of the CareFirst case study toexamine
the extent to which CareFirst was fulfffling its mission,the long-term
viability of such a mission, and the governance structuresthat would
facilitate implementation of this mission.19 Moregenerally, this case
study analysis highlights the need for research elucidatingthe charac-
teristics of markets that influence the viability ofnonprofit health plans
and the scope for welfare-improving marketinterventions. Finally,
I began this paper by noting that every conversionpetition is unique;
the analyses of CareFirst, the mid-Atlantic marketsin which it oper-
ates, and the arguments in support of or againstconversion cannot nec-
essarily be generalized to health plans petitioningfor conversion in
other markets. The framework exposited in this paperis entirely gen-
eral, however, and I hope that it will make acontribution to those
charged with the challenging tasks of analyzing andevaluating the
complex public policy issues surrounding health plan conversions.
Notes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the NBER 2003Frontiers in Health Policy
Research Conference that took place in Washington, D.C., in June2003. The research for
this paper was funded in part by the D.C. Appleseed Center for Lawand Justice, a public
advocacy organization that became a formal party to the official conversionproceedings
of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan, CareFirst Inc. I amgrateful to Richard Herzog,
Walter Smith, Richard Meyer, Jack Needleman, and participants inthe NBER 2003
Frontiers in Health Policy Research Conference for helpful commentsand conversations.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Direct, Research Report: Blues Convert toFor-Profits to
Compete, November 12, 2002.
Quoted in Blackstone, Erwin A., and Joseph P. FuEr (1998). "Blue Cross:Health
Insurance," in David I. Rosenbaum, (ed.), Market Dominance, Westport,Conn.: Praeger
Publishers, 179-180.
Blackstone and Fuhr (1998). "Blue Cross: Health Insurance."
Most BCBS plans convert to a public-stock company as a steptoward merging with
or being acquired by another BCBS plan; theexistence of publicly traded stock facilitates
the ownership transfer and combination.
One of the association's bylaws requires that the use of theBCBS trademark can be
acquired only by another BCBS plan.
The financial proceeds from the conversion and sale orinitial public offering of a
BCBS plan do not always endow a public trust or charitable foundation.James Robinson
describes the factors that led the state government to benefitfinanciafly from the con-
version of Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New York("The Curious Conversion of
Empire Blue Cross," Health Affairs, 22(4):100-118, July/August 2003).176 Beaulieu
A recent Supreme Court ruling upheld so-called any willing provider lawsenacted
at the state level that require health maintenance organizations to acceptany qualified
doctors who want to join the HMO's provider network ("Justices: States CanForce
1-IMOs to Open Networks," by Bill Mears, CNN.com, April 2, 2003).
"Community Impact Analysis of the Proposed Conversion of CareFirst, Inc.,"a
report produced by Accenture for CareFirst Blue Cross Blue Shield, January 2002.
Robinson, James, "The Curious Conversion of Empire Blue Cross."
Testimony of William L. Jews to the Maiyland Insurance Administration, March 11,2002.
Independent valuations of CareFirst by Richard Meyer, The Blackstone Group,and
Cain Brothers found Weilpoint's offer to fall below their assessments of fairmarket val-
uation. (see Baltimore Sun article by M. William Salganik)
These enrollment data are drawn from the mandatory reports filed withthe
Insurance Commissioner's Office by health plans licensed to do business in theDistrict
of Columbia and from the national databases assembled by InterStudy. TheInterStudy
data are limited for the purpose of examining total health plan enrollment(HMO and
non-HMO) in the following manner. While InterStudy is recognizedas the leading
source of data on health plans offering HMO products, the universe of plans in these data
excludes health plans that do not offer an HMO product, but it includes dataon non-
HMO products for health plans that also offer an lIMO. Hence, the sample of health
plans in InterStudy is incomplete in its inclusion of purely non-HMO plans.
These enrollment and market share data were obtained from the healthplan filings
with the D.C. Insurance Commissioners Office, except for the enrollment data forthe
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). The form filed with theInsurance
Commissioner's Office does not list FEHBP enrollment, but it does list thetotal premi-
ums collected by the plan for this product. The InterStudy database contains dataon
FEHBP enrollment for nearly all of the health plans operating in D.C. The CareFirstplan
operating under the name of Group Hospitalization and Medical Services, Inc. (GHMSI)
does not offer an HMO product and is therefore not included in the InterStudydatabase.
FEHBP enrollment for GHMSI was imputed in the followingmanner. Using the pre-
mium data from the D.C. Insurance Commissioner's Office filings and enrollment data
from InterStudy, I computed the average FEHBP premium for all health plansoffering an
FEHBP plan in D.C., except for GHMSI. I then imputed FEHBP enrollment forGHMSI
by dividing its total FEHBP premiums by theaverage FEHBP premium in D.C.
Managed-care companies may transfer some of this risk to healthcare providers
through contracts that involve prospective payment (i.e., capitation).
The data on health plan enrollment by product type was taken from health plan fil-
ings with the D.C. Insurance Commissioner's Office. These dataare aggregated at the
health plan level, and geographical breakdownswere not available (e.g., the number of
GHMSI PPO enrollees in the District of Columbia). Furthermore, FEHBP enrollmentwas
not included in these data. With the exception of GHMSI, itappears that all of the FEHBP
health plans offered in D.C. are HIVIO plans.
Recall that the sample of plans included in the InterStudy database is defined byany
plan offering an HMO product (hence, GHIvISI is not included in theInterStudy data-
base). Once GHMSI is included in the sample, however, InterStudyreports enrollment in
all types of products (not just lIMO products). Because of the sampleselection,
InterStudy may underestimate enrollment in non-lIMO products.An Economic Analysis of Health Plan Conversions 177
This is true only to the extent that local health plan enrollment is independentof (not
correlated with) total regional or national enrollment.
See Himmeistein et al. (1999) and Landort et al. (2001).
I was originally hired as a consultant by D.C. Appleseed to examine thepotential
consequences of CareFirst converting to stockownership and being acquired by
Welipoint. Not until the formal conversion proceedings were well underwaydid it
become clear to me that issues of viability and governance structureswould play a
central role in the decision calculus of policy makers and regulatory officials.
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